Sweet nothings

Ask an evolutionary psychologist to explain the evolutionary psychology way of thinking to you. I am fairly confident they will give you the following example. Humans evolved in  environments where sugary, energy dense foods were scarce. Thus, they evolved a strong motivation to consume these foods when available, and, importantly, no ‘stop’ mechanism; they never needed one, there was never enough sugar available for it to be too much. In ancestral environments, this worked fine, but in modern environments where sugary, energy-dense foods are abundant, it causes problems. People over-eat sweet sugary foods, and this is one of the driving factors in the epidemic of obesity.

This is a great example of key evolutionary psychology concepts: the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, evolved psychological mechanisms, mismatch. It’s memorable and everybody seems to be able to relate to it. There is only one tiny problem with it. I almost feel churlish bringing it up. The problem is that everything about could be untrue.

Embedded in this hardy ev psych perennial are a number of propositions, which we can enumerate as follows:

  1. Sweet energy dense foods were rare in ancestrally relevant environments.
  2. Humans lack psychological mechanisms whose function is to curtail or inhibit consumption of sweet energy-dense foods when these are abundant.
  3. (Therefore) as sweet, energy dense foods become more available with modernity, humans consume more and more of them.
  4. This overconsumption of sugar is a major cause of the obesity epidemic.

My report card on those claims (based, I must stress, on pretty superficial acquaintance with the evidence) is roughly as follows. 1. No; 2. No; 3. Not really; and 4. Probably not.

First claim 1: sweet foods were rare in ancestrally relevant environments. These kinds of things are hard to be sure about, of course, and the food environments humans have successfully lived in are highly variable. But something we can do is investigate the diets of contemporary warm-climate hunter-gatherers. They are not ancestral human societies, but their ecological conditions are closer to that than those of most contemporary populations.

Honey is the sweetest, most energy dense food known. As Frank Marlowe and colleagues show in an important review, warm-climate hunter-gatherers eat loads of honey. In their sample, 15 of 16 warm-climate hunter-gatherer populations took honey, and the other one lived largely on boats. For the Mbuti of the Congo basin, up to 80% of their calories can be from honey at times during the rainy season. For the Hadza of Tanzania, about 30% of what men bring back to camp is honey, and honey accounts for about 15% of all calories consumed overall. The biggest haul of honey brought back to camp in a single day was 14kg. Fourteen kilos! Assuming 20-30 people in a camp, that’s around half a kilo of honey each. Can you imagine what it would be like to eat half a kilo of honey at a sitting? Using the NHS guidelines of 30g of dietary sugars per day, and taking honey as basically pure sugar, that is half a year’s worth of sugar for every person, turning up  in front of you, on a single day.

Looking at data like these, it is hard to conclude that in ancestral environments there was never enough sweet food around to select for  mechanisms for regulating one’s intake (think about the immediate glycaemic load as much as anything else). A metabolically challenging surfeit of sweet foods was perhaps, in many environments, a regular occurrence. And all our cousins the African great apes take honey too, so, as Marlowe et al. conclude, exposure to honey is a feature that goes back to our last common ancestor with chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas. Before we even talk about fruit.

What about proposition 2, humans have no psychological mechanisms for saying ‘no more!’ to sweet things. Reports of the non-existence of these mechanisms do seem to have been somewhat exaggerated. In fact, French-Canadian physiologist Michel Cabanac has had rather a distinguished career studying them, since well before the ev psych meme got round. It’s a shame nobody thought to check. The sweet-food stop mechanism actually looks like a great example of an evolved psychological mechanism.

The key phenomenon is ‘negative alliesthesia’, the change in the hedonic value of a stimulus the more of it you have. The term applies to all kinds of stimuli, but it was coined in a 1973 article in the journal Phyiology & Behavior with the stop-too-much mechanism for sweet foods specifically in mind. A more recent study shows the phenomenon very nicely. Participants chewed on a caramel or drank a sweet drink every 3 minutes, for as long as they liked. Each time, they rated the pleasantness of the sweet taste along a line with the centre at ‘neither pleasant nor unpleasant’.

Representative data are shown for one subject below (we can ignore the difference between the initial session and the three month follow up for present purposes). Sweet stuff is pleasant, at first, and progressively less so. Somewhere between 15 and 27 minutes in, it goes from being pleasant to being unpleasant. Within about 40 minutes, it becomes so awful that you have to stop. You simply can’t hack any more. So much for no stop signal, then. These people stopped eating after what is equivalent to a few tens of grams of honey.

Negative alliesthesia: sweet stuff becomes more unpleasant as you have more of it. This makes you stop.

My favourite study of negative alliesthesia for sweet foods comes from North Africa, and Cabanac was once again involved. In a population that valorizes adiposity, young women are sequestered away for several months and deliberately overfed in preparation for marriage. In particular, they are overfed sweet things. In the study of young women exposed to this overfeeding institution, only about a third of them gained weight, despite very strong social pressure to do so. The striking finding of the study was a very large decrease in the perceived pleasantness of sweet foods. This occurred in every single subject. The main (presumably unintended) consequence of this institution, it turns out, is not to make people fat, but to make people go off sweet things.

Alright, you say, but everyone knows that proposition 3 is true, no? That people are tucking in to more and more sweet stuff as modernity goes along. Well, that is not very clear either. Annette Wittekind and Janette Walton reviewed the longitudinal evidence on sugar consumption in high-income countries. Thirteen countries had comparable data at more than one time point over the last fifty years, though exactly when the first and last time point was varied (the first was some time after about 1970, the last was some time prior to now). Countries were not easily comparable to one another due to differences in measurement, but the direction of their trend over time could at least be established.

The authors identified 49 possible comparisons, where a comparison consisted of the change over time of a particular age group of a particular sex in a particular country. Most of these comparisons (55%) showed declines or stability in sugar consumption, with 14% showing an increase, and the rest showing something like an increase followed by a decrease. What is clear from these data is that there has been no general increase in sugar consumption in affluent countries in the last few decades; if anything, decreases are more common. Yet, people’s disposable incomes have generally increased over this period. They had more and more money to spend on food (and sweet foods probably got cheaper in real terms). You would think, if they had an evolved craving for sweet stuff and no stop mechanism, that they would have consumed more and more of it. Yet, if anything, the opposite happened. The same pattern you see longitudinally is mirrored cross-sectionally: those who have more to spend on food consume less sugar, not more (because sugars are cheap forms of calories in our food system).

What about proposition 4? The causes of the obesity epidemic are complex. Increased  sugar consumption cannot be a monofactorial explanation, not least because obesity has exploded over exactly the time scale that Wittekind and Walton showed sugar intakes to be mostly declining or stable. It’s not even clear that increased overall energy intake is an important cause of the obesity epidemic: though this increased in the late twentieth century (in the USA), some studies now show it falling, even as obesity continues to rise. (A limitation of all these studies is that the energy intake is the theoretical, calorimetric energy value of the foods; this might be very different from the energy that becomes metabolically available.)  Just as it is possible for animals to gain fat mass without eating more , the prevalence of obesity may be able to increase in populations without changes in total energy intake being a particularly important driver. It’s not just how much potential energy comes in through the mouth, but what it is made up of, how it is digested, how much energy is expended in movement and at rest, and how available energy is allocated between adipose tissue and other functions such as immunity and cellular repair.

Evolutionary psychologists’ obsession with the uncanny visceral appeal of sweet foods is probably better analysed through the lens of Pierre Bourdieu than that of Charles Darwin. Being slim and eschewing sugar are markers of social class, of distinction, in our present cultural environment. If you are ever in the UK, go to an academic’s house and ask for three sugars in your tea, and you will see what I mean. It is all too easy for the middle-class academics to project their neurotic concern about distinction (do I eat too much sugar and not enough spinach? Is it a failing that I don’t read Heidegger in the original German?) back on to some primeval imagined community. If evolutionary psychology is to make convincing mismatch arguments, they need to have a close relationship to actual evidence, in particular from anthropology and human biology. Otherwise, the present risks ending up explaining the past, rather than the other way around.

The UK 2024 General Election result is not quite what it seems

This blog is mainly about (social) science, but my interest in and concern about poverty and inequality makes it a bit about politics too. And this is just a brief post to explain the UK Labour Party’s landslide election win on 4th July 2024; what it is, and importantly is not.

On the progressive side of the argument, there are always two analyses of how to more forward. One (the brave new world approach) is that you have to offer something bold, visionary a thorough-going reform of all of our current institutions to capture and energise the broad, latent desire for a better life for most people. The other (the steady as she goes approach) is that you have to move to the centre, not scare the media or business, and propose more or less a continuation of the status quo, but with slightly better intentions, a bit more competence, and a promise that you will use your new-gained power and any windfall to help people disfavoured by the current settlement as and when you can.

On the face of it, Keir Starmer’s 2024 landslide represents a triumph for the second approach. This is particularly so when contrasted with Jeremy Corbyn’s in 2017. 2017 was a brave new world manifesto, and an other-wordly leader. 2024 was a ruthlessly steady-as-she-goes, disciplined message, offering very little actual reform of our institutions, no extra taxation and not much extra expenditure, and ruling out radical reforms like basic income and wealth taxes. It looks like the strategy was a triumph, winning 410 seats in the 650-seat House of Commons. My colleagues here in France are asking me how Starmer did it: how did he crack making the centre-left great again? A long article in yesterday’s Le Parisien was presenting Starmer as a determined genius, who has shown that you will win people’s votes and defuse right-wing populism by moving to the centre ground and being relentlessly sensible and orthodox. And lamenting, of course, that no-one has managed to do this in France, where we face the second round of legislative elections this Sunday, and the prospect of a right-populist government.

The UK result seems, in other words, to argue against the need for – or wisdom of – a radical reform agenda like one we just proposed in Act Now, and for an incremental, more centrist approach.

Not so fast though. The large Labour landslide last night is a very particular product of the way the UK election system works, and of the disarray of the other parties. It does not say anything very general about what people want from the state right now. There are very important ways in which Labour lost last night.

First, the votes. In 2017, Labour got 12.9 million votes. With 99% of the votes counted, in 2024, they have 9.7 million. So, they have lost about 3 million voters. (Even compared to Corbyn’s ‘worst performance since 1935’, namely 2019, Labour have lost about half a million votes). How could Labour possibly have done so well in terms of parliamentary numbers this time with such a low vote? It is simply because the other main party has lost even more: the Conservatives polled 14 million in 2017 and 2019, and only about 7 million last night. This is because they presided over a series of scandals and a lot of instability. If there is one thing people like about conservatives, it is that they conserve effectively, not lurch from crisis to crisis. And Labour also gained a lot of seats in Scotland last night, where circumstances are rather particular: the incumbent party there, the Scottish National Party, had had a series of scandals and changes and shed votes, allowing Labour to move from second place to first in a number of places.

Where have the lost voters all gone, three million from Labour and seven million from the Conservatives? Three or four million have gone to the populist right in the form of the Reform party. A smaller number have gone away from the Labour party to the left, in the form of Greens and independents, who have done well in this election. But the biggest beneficiary of all is ‘Did not vote’. ‘Did not vote’ had a better performance than Labour in this election by some margin: almost 20 million (non) votes to Labour’s 10 million-ish. At the 1945 General Election, 73% of all registered electors voted; last night it was more like 60%.

So, in brief, does Starmer’s victory say anything very generalisable or reproducible about how to advance the progressive cause in the reality of current electoral politics, and how to defuse the populist right? Perhaps not. The populist right has done pretty well in this election, just been kept from having more seats in parliament by the first-past-the-post electoral system.  And, it can hardly be said that Labour has been elected with a great surge of popular support. More like they are beneficiaries of the bizarreness of the electoral system. There is a large segment of the population disaffected with all of the current offerings, which may well be captured by other political offerings in the future, as they were in the Brexit vote (and as has happened here in France this year).

The truth is we still don’t know how many votes Labour could have got with a more ambitious, redistributive, green, Act Now style offering, because the experiment has not been done. Perhaps most critically, the election process seems to have done little to foster public discussion and deliberation about how society should actually be reformed to make things better. This seems like a missed opportunity. Perhaps, now that the election is over with, the democratic process can begin.